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1. Introduction 
The millennial advent of a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), pursued by the 
United States of America (USA) in the wake of devastating terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9111), cast 
gloom on the prospects of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue in an increasingly 
interdependent world. The USA's conduct of GWOT has been subjected to various 
censures by analysts for being over-militaristic, neglecting ideological warfare and 
uncritically aggregating disparate trends of terrorism. l However, in the latter years of 
George W. Bush's presidency (2001-09), more enli.ghtened policy-makers and advisors 
have been able to recognise the utmost importance of winning the 'battle of ideas' as an 
indispensable strategy towards achieving the aims of GWOT.2 
As a long term measure, the sphere of education has emerged as the most crucial 
battleground in the endeavour to foster democratic development, political pluralism, 
religious tolerance and respect for human rights in the Muslim world. Many Western-
based accounts attribute a vital role to religious schools in spreading Islamist ideology 
and maintaining radical nexuses. A study commissioned by the USA Air Force, noting 
the Malaysian government's concern that "Islamic schools have become a breeding 
ground for militant Islam," has urged the USA, other concerned countries and 
international institutions to advocate "reform of religious schools to ensure that these 
schools are able to provide a broad modern education" in the belief that such reform is 
"key to breaking the cycle of radicalized madrassas [sic] producing cannon fodder for 
radical and terrorist groups.,,3 Although empirical studies of terrorists' educational 
backgrounds have cast doubt upon the veritability of the link between a specifically 
Islamic education and violent-prone religious extremism, the case is peculiarly argued in 
the case of Southeast Asia, to the extent of pin-pointing the so-called radical Islamic 
1 C£ David J. Kilcullen, 'Countering Global Insurgency', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 4 
(2005), pp. 597-617; Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya, 'Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist 
Threat', The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 1 (2006), pp. 59-83. 
2 Hady Arnr and P.W. Singer, 'To Win the "War on Terror," We Must First Win the "War ofIdeas": Here's 
How', The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 618, no. 1 (2008), pp. 
212-222. 
3 Angel M. Rabasa, 'Overview' in Angel M. Rabasa et. ai, The Muslim World after 9/11 (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2004), p. 62. 
schools in Malaysia and Indonesia. 4 Recent reports produced by the International Crisis. 
Group on southern Thailand and Indonesia also seemingly substantiate the proposition 
that secondary-level Islamic schools do provide a mainstay for militant Islamists.5 
To many international observers, Malaysia has often stood out as a bright spot 
amidst the generally dismal portrayal of the ummah (global Muslim community). Singer 
mentions Malaysia's exceptional success "in embracing globalization,"6 and even newly 
elected USA President Obama acknowledges Kuala Lumpur's "astonishing progress."7 
Nonetheless, Malaysia'S embrace of modernisation and an open economy is said to have 
opened floodgates for the importation of transnational Islamist personnel and ideologies, 
including the radical variety. Caution has been drawn to the fact that Malaysians figure 
among the most wanted terrorists in Southeast Asia, g and that the Malaysian state's weak 
security controls has rendered it susceptible to exploitation by terrorist networks as a host 
for radical Islamist web sites and front companies, a haven for regional terrorist suspects 
and a conduit for illegal trafficking of terrorist accoutrements. 9 For example, 
disproportionate hue and cry has been raised over the role of two private religious 
schools, Al Tarbiyah Luqmanul Hakiem in Johore and Sekolah Menengah Arab Darul 
Anilar in Kelantan, both of which have been closed down, in serving as recruitment hubs 
4 S. Yunanto and Syaluul Hidayat, 'Introduction, Problem Statement and Methodology' in S. Yunanto, et. 
aI, Islamic Education in South and Southeast Asia [Diversity, Problems and Strategy] (Jakarta: The RIDEP 
Institute - Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005), pp. 7-13; Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, 'The Madrassa 
Scapegoat', The Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), p. 123; Justin Magouirk and Scott Atran, 
'Jemaah Isiamiyah's radical madrassah networks', Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, vol. 1, no. 1 (2008), 
pp.25-4l. 
5 Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand (BangkokIBrussels: International Crisis Group, 22 June 2009); 
Indonesia: NOOl"din Top's Support Base (Jakarta/Brusse1s: International Crisis Group, 27 August 2009), pp. 
10-II. 
6 Peter Warren Singer, 'America, Islam, and the 9111 War', Current History, vol. 105, issue 695 (2006), pp. 
415-422. 
7 'Full text: Barack Obama's Cairo speech', http://www.guardian.co.uk!worldl2009/junl04lbarack-obama-
keynote-speech-egypt, posted 4 June 2009 (accessed 13 November 2009). 
g A Malaysian, Noordin Mohammed Top, was thought to be responsible for a string of high-profile terrorist 
stunts including the July 2009 Jakarta botel bombings before being gunned down in Solo in September 
2009. His fellow Malaysian comrade, bomb maker Dr. Azahari Rusin, was slain during a sbootout with 
Indonesian security forces in East Java in November 2005. Both were allegedly linked to the regional 
Jemaah lslamiah (IT: Islamic Congregation) network. 
9 Rohan Gunaratna, 'Understanding AI Qaeda and its Network in Southeast Asia' in Kumar Ramakrishna 
and See Seng Tan (eds.), After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies and World Scientific, 2003), pp. 125-128; Zachary Abuza, 'AI Qaeda in 
Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages' in Ramakrishna and Tan (eds.), After Bali, pp. 135-143; Kumar 
Ramakrishna, 'Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia', Contempormy Southeast Asia, 
vol. 27, no. 3 (2005), pp. 349-354, 358-359. 
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for the Jemaah Islamiah (IT: Islamic Congregation) network and its alleged Malaysian 
proxy, the clandestine Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM:: Mujahidin Group of 
Malaysia).lO The KMJ\1, in turn, is said to harbour furtive connections with certain leaders 
of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (pAS: Islamic Party of Malaysia),ll a mainstream opposition 
party which today helms state governments of Kelantan and Kedah, holds executive 
council positions in Selangor through participation in the Pakatan Rakyat (PR: People's 
Pact) coalition Both KM:M and PAS boast outstanding transnational connections of their 
own. 12 
The present study is a modest attempt to redress the jaundiced perspectives found 
in writings which deal with Islamic education in Southeast Asia in the GWOT era. In 
arriving at a conceptual understanding of Islamic education, the author utilises paradigms 
considered autochthonous to the Islamic intellectual tradition and vernacular sources 
which appeared to have eluded foreign-based studies of Islamic education in Southeast 
Asia. A more nuanced picture of Islamic education in Southeast Asia will hopefully 
emerge from the present undertaking. 
2. Globalisation and Contemporary Southeast Asian Islam 
In the 1990s, the term 'globalisation' gained wide currency as a description of the 
centripetal shrinking of national borders into a 'global village' where technologically-
driven homogenising processes of economic, social, cultural, political and even 
intellectual resources take place wittingly or unwittingly. Globalisation can thus be 
perceived as a standardising mechanism at multiple levels of analytical units, each level 
reaching uniformity at different stages. Liberal-capitalist ideologues attach deterministic 
10 Zachary Abuza, 'AI Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages', pp. l36-137; Angel Rabasa, 
'Islamic Education in Southeast Asia' in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (eds.), Current 
Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume 2 (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005), pp. 103, 105. 
11 Kamarulnizarn Abdullah, 'Understanding and Responding to the Threats of Muslim Militant Groups in 
Malaysia' in Kamarulzaman Askandar (ed.), Understanding and Managing Militant Movements in 
Southeast Asia (penang: Southeast Asian Studies Conflict Network, 2005), pp. 39-42. 
12 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 'Transnational Islam in Malaysia' in Peter Mandaville et. al., Transnational 
Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics (Seattle: National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), pp. 150-153, 161-162. 
qualities to globalisation, often relating it to the concurrent processes of modernisation 
and secularisation. The emergence of Islam as a salient mobilising factor in world politics 
in the 1970s and 1980s, emanating from mainly the Middle East, was theoretically 
problematic as the influence of religion was thought to be inversely related to the above 
processes. The declining importance of primordial factors such as ethnicity and religion 
was held to be a fait accompli in sync with modernisation and later, globalisation. 13 
Notwithstanding the many facets of globalisation one may conceive, its economic 
dimension, as predicated by the market-driven capitalism of hegemonic Western entities, 
has received widest prominence in both policy-making and academic circles. 14 Muslims' 
bitter experiences with earlier phases of globalisation, such as the encounters with 
medieval Crusades and colonialism, has elicited widespread concern that globalisation 
results in nothing less than a perpetuation of the ummah's humiliation at the hands of 
Western powers.15 The wide gulf between the prosperous West and the downtrodden 
ummah, as measured by tangible economic indicators, drags the ummah into a vicious 
circle of urban poverty, deprivation of education and alienation among Muslim youths 
consequently driven to extremist interpretations of Islam. 16 In their search for solutions, 
Muslim elites and intellectuals in their newly independent nation states unleashed a 
distinct but parallel process of globalisation emphasising Islam's universal ideals. As the 
argument goes, with the prevalence of transnational economic structures spelling the 
practical end of the nation-state, the ummatic character of Islamic unity offers for 
Muslims the best interface in their unavoidable engagement with a foreign-imposed 
13 Jonathan Fox, 'Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations', International Studies 
Review, vol. 3, issue 3 (2001), pp. 53-59; Mustapha Kamal Pasha and Ahmed 1. Samatar (1996), 'The 
Resurgence of Islam' in James H. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 191-192. -
14 Pasha and Samatar, 'The Resurgence of Islam', pp. 189-191. 
15 Abdul Rashid Moten, 'Modernization and the Process of Globalization: The Muslim Experience and 
Responses' in K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, 
Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2005), pp. 236-246. 
16 Andrew Johnston, 'Disparities of Wealth Are Seen as Fuel for Terrorism', International Herald Tribune, 
20 December 2001. In a recent interview with Time magazine, Indonesian president Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono identified "lack of education, poverty, marginalization and pockets of radicalism" as some of 
the roots and causes of terrorism in Indonesia; see 'Q&A: We Want to Harness the Forces of Moderation.', 
Time, 16 November 2009. 
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quagmire of a liberal-capitalist 'global village,.17 One manifestation of such Islamic 
globalisation, or rather counter-globalisation, the increasing significance attached to the 
role of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in charting the course of recent 
Muslim states' foreign policies.18 As a rapidly developing region, Southeast Asia is 
susceptible to the two distinct, yet similarly even if unequally, powerful forces of 
globalisation. 19 Both have influenced the region's recent upsurge of political Islam, with 
Southeast Asia conventionally being considered to be at the receiving end of both global 
nexuses. In both sets of relationships, the rich characteristics which have marked out 
Southeast Asian Islam as sui generis have often been overlooked or given perfunctory 
mention. 
Yet, if we were to map the driving factors behind contemporary political Islam in 
Southeast Asia, it would be difficult to draw a clear line separating global and local 
factors. More often than not, global and local factors have interacted in such a way that 
regional variables acquire dynamics of their own. While this has been the case in all 
Southeast Asian states, it is arguably more pronounced in the Muslim-majority states of 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Both countries were affected by the wave of Islamism that 
reached Southeast Asia in the '1980s from not only from the Middle East but also from 
Islarnist diasporas in the West. 20 Whereas the Malaysian state responded 
accommodatively, Indonesia resorted to repression of political Islamists, hence the higher 
receptiveness of Islamist elements to radical tendencies which dominated the socio-
political scene in the first few years following the downfall of Suharto's New Order 
regime in 1998.21 Turning to the plight of aggrieved Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia, 
scholars have emphasised their 'fundamental grievances' such as prolonged socio-
17 Pasha and Samatar, 'The Resurgence of Islam', p. 196; Moten, 'Modernization and the Process of 
Globalization', p. 249. 
18 Jeff Haynes, 'Transnational religious actors and international politics', Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, 
no. 2 (2001), pp. 152-156. 
19 Johan H. Meuleman, , 'The History ofIslam in Southeast Asia: Some Questions and Debates' in Nathan 
and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 35; Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, 'The 
Impact of September lIon Islam in Southeast Asia' in Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), 
Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 331. 
20 Martin van Bruinessen, 'Global and Local in Indonesian Islam', Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 
(1999), pp. 169-170; Azyumarcli Azra, 'Bali and Southeast Asian Islam: Debunking the Myths' in 
Ramakrishna and Tan (eds.), After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 44. 
21 Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia and the Challenge of Radical Islam After October 12' in Ramakrishna and Tan 
(eds.), After Bali, pp. 344-350; Noorhaidi Hasan, 'September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order 
Indonesia' in Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 305-308. 
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economic dislocation and systematic denial of indigenous identities as underlying causes 
of dissatisfaction which eventually erupted into sporadic insurrection?2 Without 
discounting international religious solidarity as a contributory factor in the rebellions of 
Muslim minorities of southern Thailand and southern Philippines, national political 
considerations have been more important in conditioning the nature and extent of 
political Islam in both territories.23 As far links with international militant Islamist 
networks are concerned, they simply tap upon these root causes, supplying the necessary 
training and inirastructural know-how in order to instigate terrorist feats. The much-
touted AI Qaeda network, rather than being the focus of allegiance from Southeast Asian 
Islamist militants, was more likely a source of inspiration whose foray into Southeast 
Asia utilised local insurgents whose domestic agenda and concerns preceded and 
outweighed those of global pan-Islamism.24 
3. Islamic Education: Its Concept and Genesis 
For analytical purposes, 'Islamic education' in this paper refers to an integrated 
process of imparting Islamic knowledge such that its recipients are equipped spiritually, 
intellectually and physically in order to execute their twin God-ordained roles, as His 
servants and vicegerents on earth.25 The Arabic term tarbiyyah has been most commonly 
used to denote 'education', but other terms such as ta'lim and ta'dib have also gained 
wide currency within Muslim educational circles.26 Ta'lim, from the root word 'allama 
22 Cf. Andrew Tan, 'Southeast Asia as the 'Second Front' in the War Against Terrorism: Evaluating 
Threats and Responses', Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 15, no. 2 (2003), pp. 134-135. 
23 RI. May, 'The Religious Factor in Three Minority Movements: The Moro of the Philippines, the Malays 
of Thailand, and Indonesia's West Papuans', ContemporalY Southeast Asia, vol. 13, no. 4 (1992), pp. 409-
411. 
24 Barry Desker, 'Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations', Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 16, no. 3 (2003), p. 421. 
25 M. Kamal Hassan, 'Some Dimensions of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia' in Taufik Abdullah and 
Sharon Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: lnstituteof Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1986), p. 40; Zawawi H;i. Ahmad, 'Pendidikan Islam: Ditinjau Daripada Sudut Prinsip, Konsep dan 
Matklamatnya' in Abd. Halim El-Muharnmady (ed.), Pendidikan Islam: Peranannya Dalam Pembangunan 
Ummah (Bangi: Persatuan Bekas Mahasiswa Islam Timur Tengah, 1994), pp. 13-34. 
26 Cf. Muhammad Uthman El-Muhammady, Islam: Peribadi Tarbiah dan Institusi (Kota Bharu: Majlis 
Ugama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan, 1987), pp. 123-124; Anne Sofie Roald, Tarbiya: 
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(to teach), refers primarily to the teaching and learning process. Tarbiyyah connotes the 
processes of 'bringing out', 'developing', 'nurturing', 'fostering', 'nourishing', 'rearing' 
and 'cherishing' as applied to objects under one's possession. Because of its generic 
qualities, argues Syed Naquib AI-Attas, tarbiyyah is less preferable than ta'dib to 
elucidate an Islamic concept of education. To Al-Attas, education is "the instilling and 
inculcation of adab in man;" adab essentially indicating disciplining of the mind and 
soul, acquisition of good qualities of the mind and soul, performance of correct as against 
erroneous and of right as against wrong action, and preservation from disgrace. 27 Ta'dib, 
therefore, reflects a moralistic outlook on life within a hierarchical structure of authority 
which recognises the sublime position of God as "the Fountain of all true knowledge," to 
be followed by legitimate men of "intelligence, spiritual knowledge and virtue.,,28 While 
tarbiyyah can be generalised to cover minerals, plants and animals, with the end of 
tarbiyyah being measurable in material and quantitative terms, ta'dib is specific to 
human, whose spiritual nature as made up of one's soul (oofs) and intellect (aql) are 
accountable for one's actions in fulfilling or neglecting one's individual covenant with 
God.29 As such accountability is valid throughout one's adult life so long as one is 
intellectually sound and physically mature, Islamic education is fundamentally a lifelong 
process in both [olIDal and informal senses.30 
Knowledge (Arabic: 'iZ,n) is a sacred concept derived from God, its Ultimate 
Giver. Epistemologically, knowledge has been defined as "arrival in / of the soul of/at 
the meaning of a thing or an object;" 'meaning' (Arabic: ma 'na) here referring to its 
authentic or correct version as "determined by the Islamic vision of reality and truth as 
Education and Politics in Islamic Movements in Jordan and Malaysia (Lund: Lund Studies in History of 
Religions, 1994), p. 14; Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1995), pp. 5-8; Mohd. Yusuf Ahmad, Falsafah dan Sejarah Pendidikan Islam 
(Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 2002), pp. 27-29; J. Mark Halstead, 'An Islamic concept of 
education', Comparative Education, vol. 40, no. 4 (2004), p. 522. 
27 Syed Muhanunad Al-Naquib Al-Attas, 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and the 
Definition and Aims of Education' in Syed Muhammad Al-Naquib Al-Attas (ed.), Aims and Objectives of 
Islamic Education (Jeddah: Hodder and Stoughton for King Abdulaziz University, 1979), pp. 36-37. 
28 Syed Muhanunad AI-Naquib Al-Attas, 'Introduction' in Syed Muhammad AI-Naquib Al-Attas (ed.), 
Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, p. 3. 
29 Al-Attas, 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and the Definition and Aims of Education', 
pp. 24-25; Syed Muhanunad Naquib Al-Attas, The Concept of Education in Islam: A Frameworkfor an 
Islamic Philosophy of Education (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization, 1991), pp. 29-32. 
30 Mohd. Yusuf Alunad, Falsafah dan Sejarah Pendidikan Islam, p. 34. 
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projected by the Quranic conceptual system.,,3J Hence, according to the Islamic 
worldview, the end of knowledge must necessarily be "the recognition of the proper 
place of God in the order of being and existence.'m Since education necessarily involves 
the act of seeking knowledge, which makes up the content of education, the purpose of 
Islamic education can be summarised as "to produce a good man;" 'good' here referring 
to the 'justice' (Arabic: 'ad!) one accords oneself in acknowledging God as one's 
"Possessor, Creator, Sustainer, Cherisher, Provider."33 'Knowledge' is here to be 
distinguished from 'information', which may not necessarily be predicated on divinely 
ascertained truth and therefore incapable of raising its seeker to the level of a 'good' man 
who benefits other mankind. 34 AI-Attas identifies "confusion and error in knowledge" as 
the "chief cause" of variegated dilemmas engulfing the ummah, giving rise to a 
leadership crisis in all Muslim nations. 35 As a result of Western-induced secularisation of 
Muslim societies, Muslims have become disorientated as to the aim of education, which 
has assumed the secular role of merely producing 'good citizens' for their nation-states.36 
Beginning from informal transmission of material from the Quran, Islam's holy 
book, and hadith37 collections - together constituting revealed knowledge, the Islamic 
educational process gradually expanded to encompass formal instruction of Quran- and 
hadith-derived branches of knowledge such as tawhid (unitarian theology), fiqh 
Uurisprudence), tasawwuf (sufism or spirituality), tafsir (Quranic exegesis), mustalah al-
hadith (hadith methodology), tajwid (science of Quranic recitation), and different aspects 
of Arabic grammar such as nahu, saraf and balaghah. These subjects constitute the 
traditional Islamic sciences, with tawhid, fiqh and tasawwuf forming a tripartite fard 
3J AI-Attas, The Concept of Education in Islam, pp. 17-18. 
32 Al-Attas, The Concept of Education in Islam, p. 19. 
33 Al-Attas, The Concept of Education in Islam, p. 23. 
34 Wan Mohd. Nor Wan Daud, Budaya Ilmu: Konsep, Prasyarat dan Pelaksanaan di Malaysia (Kuala 
Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1989), pp. 3-4. 
35 Al-Attas, 'Introduction', pp. 2-3; Al-Atlas, The Concept of Education in Islam, pp. 34-35. 
36 Al-Attas, 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and the Definition and Aims of Education', 
pp.32-33. 
37 A hadith refers to a saying or action of the Prophet Muhammad as reported by any of his Companions or 
wives, and passed through successive Muslim generations until ultimately compiled by specialist scholars 
called muhaddithin. In orthodox Sunni Islam, the most authoritative books of hadith are the compilations of 
Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875), and followed by those of Abu Dawud (d. 888), Tirmidhi (d. 888), 
Nasa'i (d. 9l3) and Ibn Majah (d. 886). The Sunnah, a more wide-ranging term literally meaning 'the 
Prophet's trodden path', is made up of the hadith, the Prophet's practice emulated by his Companions and 
the Prophet's approval of the Companions' deeds. 
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'ain38 syllabus. As the body of knowledge further expanded, Muslim scholars mastered 
the worldly sciences, and religious instruction was broadened to incorporate fard 
kifayah39 subjects such as al-hisab (mathematics), al-handasah (geometry), mantiq 
(logic), al-tib (medicine), al-jighrafia (geography), al-badi' (metaphor) and al-bayan 
(rhetoric). The classification of knowledge above is generally credited to the Persian 
scholar Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), whose religious thought has had tremendous 
impact in Southeast Asia. The medieval sociologist Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) classified 
knowledge into 'ulum naqlyyiah (revealed sciences) and 'ulum aq/iyyah (rational 
sciences), which correspond to the 'perennial knowledge' and 'acquired knowledge' 
categories proposed by the Hasan Langgulung (d. 2008), an Indonesian educationist long 
based at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (HUM), Kuala Lumpur. Ibn 
Khaldun included ilmu kalam (theo10gy),fiqh, the Quran and hadith as 'ulum naqliyyah, 
to which Langgulung adds tasawwuj, and subsumed mathematics, logic and language 
under 'ulum aqliyyah, to which Langgulung adds engineering, medicine, agriculture and 
other disciplines which we identify today as modem sciences.4o Among Muslim scholars, 
there is broad consensus that in any educational system which professes to be Islamic, it 
is knowledge of the fard 'ain and 'ulum naqliyyah type that should be prioritised as 
forming the core of the curriculum.41 
Islamic education started off via informal channels connecting the Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) with a close circle of relatives and companions in the 
holy city of Mecca. Since 610 AD., the Prophet received divine revelations which were 
relayed to this circle and later spread to the whole Arab Peninsula through trade 
networks. The methods utilised by Prophet to disseminate his teacrungs included 
lecturing (kulliyyah), memorisation, discussion (muhadathah), dialogue, debating 
(mujadalah), experiencing, travelling (rihlah) and study circle (halaqah).42 As the 
Prophet was ummiy (unlettered), he conducted oral lessons of verses which were later 
38 Fard 'ain refers to doctrinal and ritual obligations which must be testified to and practised by every adult 
Muslim male and female in order to legitimise his or her Islamic faith. 
39 Fard kifayah refers to collective obligations i.e. duties that must be observed by at least one unit of a 
group of believers so as to exempt the others. 
40 Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, p. 45. 
41 Al-Attas, 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and the Definition and Aims of Education', 
pp. 40-42; AI-Attas, The Concept of Education in Islam, pp. 40-42; Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan 
Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, pp. 47-48. 
42 Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, p. 68. 
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compiled into the Quran, fIrst from his home, then the house of Al-Arqam ibn Al-Arqam, 
then the Masjid NabCIYVi (Mosque of the Prophet) upon his migration to Medina in 622. 
Later, an adjacent verandah lmown as al-Suffah was constructed to host formal lessons 
for delegations who visited the Prophet from the rest of the Arab Peninsula.43 Writers and 
teachers were appointed from among the Prophet's companions to further disseminate the 
message. After the Prophet passed away, the fIrst primary schools of Quranic teaching by 
the name of kuttab or maktab emerged, with Christians and Jews forming a high 
percentage of staff. Most early kuttabs were built near mosques, but as the number of 
pupils expanded, kuttabs were constructed inside the houses of teachers and later even in 
palaces of caliphs and homes of their ministers. Upon completion oflessons in the kuttab, 
secondary education of the students proceeded to the mosque.44 Only during the period of 
Seljuk rule in Baghdad (1055-1194) was the fIrst madrasah (school) built by the vizier 
Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092). Madrasahs proliferated in Egypt under the rule of the 
legendary Saladin (d. 1193), who had earlier defeated the Fatimids, original founder of 
the famous Al-Azhar mosque-cum-university in 975. Later, madrasahs were to host 
complete educational complexes comprising mosques, libraries, hostels, lecture theatres, 
and housing quarters for teachers and other staff members.4s Henceforth began formal 
Islamic education which was not only state-subsidised but also granted ijazah - a 
certifIcate attesting the profIciency of a student in a particular discipline. This ijazah is 
essentially the precursor to the degree granted by the tertiary-level modem university, 
whose origins can be located to the Islamic jami 'ah, in much the same way as the 
medieval European college was modelled on the Islamic madrasah. 46 
43 Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, pp. 26-27; Mohd. Yusuf Ahmad, 
Falsrifah dan Sejarah Pendidikan Islam, pp. 54-55. 
44 M.A. Rauf, 'Islamic Education', Intisari, vol. 2, no. 1 (1965), p. 14; Mohd. Yusuf Ahmad, Falsrifah dan 
Sejarah Pendidikan islam, pp. 56-62. 
4S Rauf, 'Islamic Education', p. 15; Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, pp. 
33-34. 
46 Al-Attas, 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and the Definition and Aims of Education', 
p. 38; Syed Farid Alatas, An Islamic Perspective on the Commitment to Inter-Religious Dialogue (Kuala 
Lumpur: International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, 2008), pp. 28-32. 
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4. Globalisation of Islamic Education in Pre-colonial and Colonial Southeast 
Asia 
As a faith with an inherent missionary impulse transcending ethno-cultural and 
national considerations, Islam's vitality as a globalising force has always been beyond 
doubt. Ever since Islam established a foothold in Southeast Asia in the thirteenth century 
via the efforts of sufi missionaries,47 its Muslims, most of whom were from the 
indigenous Malay ethnic group, have maintained transnational contacts with peoples of 
Middle Eastern, Chinese, Indian and European origins. One of the earliest centres of 
Islamic education in Southeast Asia was Malay Sultanate of Malacca (1414-1511). Its 
ruler Parameswara's conversion to Islam upon marriage to the daughter of the Sultan of 
Pasai in 1414, unleashed enthusiasm for Islamic learning among all sections ofMalaccan 
society.48 Sultans Mansur Syah (reigned 1456-1477) and Mahmud Syah (reigned 1488-
1511) were known to have developed a penchant for sufi theosophy and great respect for 
the ulama (religious scholars: sing. 'alim) , whom they frequently consulted either 
through envoys or direct visits to their homes.49 As a measure of Malacca's global 
significance, it has been related that the conversion of Java was fore-ordained in Malacca, 
as two of the illustrious Wali Songo (Nine Saints) deemed responsible for Islamising 
Java, Sunan Bonang and Surran Giri, were educated in Malacca under the tutelage of the 
Jeddah-hailed Sheikh Wali Lanang.50 The Pulau Upih institution at which both saints 
studied is regarded as the prototype of the pondoJcl1 boarding schools that were to sprout 
across the archipelago in the coming centuries, known by various appellations such as the 
Persian-derived langgar, pesantren in Java, penjentren in Madura, surau in 
Minangkabau, and meunasah, rangkang and balee in Acheh. After the defeat of Malacca 
47 Cf. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 'The Impact of Sufism on Muslims in Pre-colonial Malaysia: An 
Overview of Interpretations', Islamic Studies, vol. 41, no. 3 (2002), p. 469. 
48 Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, pp. 122, 127. 
49 Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, pp. 128-129. 
50 Osman Bakar, 'Sufism in the Malay-Indonesian World' in Seyyed Hossein Nasr (ed.), Islamic 
Spirituality: Manifestations (London: SCM Press, 1991) pp. 266-267. 
51 Derived from the Arabicfimduq, meaning 'a place of temporary residence.' In Malay language,pondok 
literally means 'hut'. Traditional pondok schools conventionally had student boarding houses resembling 
huts built around or near the residence of the tuan guru or tok guru, as the master is known. See William R. 
Roff, 'Pondoks, Madrasahs and the Production of 'Ulama' in Malaysia', Studia Islamika: Indonesian 
Journal/or Islamic Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2004), p. 7. 
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to the Portuguese in 1511, the Acheh kingdom (1496-1650) took over Malacca's mantle 
as the regional centre of Islamic education. Pondok schools made a comeback in colonial 
Southeast Asia in the early nineteenth century i.e. after the downfall of Acheh, through 
the efforts of ulama from Patani ill southern Thailand, although links with northern 
Sumatra were never severed.52 
Until the Second World War, the pondok or pesantren institution was the 
quintessence of Islamic education in Southeast Asia. The master or tok guru had carte 
blanche over his particular pondok, but similarities could be detected. Pondok schools 
were funded by the surrounding community and imposed no fees, but many students 
developed self-sufficiency out of their vocational and agricultural activities. Their length 
of stay varied according to the number of btabs (religious books) they were mastering at 
the hands of the tok guru, assisted by mature students known as Kepala Tala 'ah (perusal 
heads I tutors). Some students moved from pondok to pondok, depending on the list of 
kitabs on offer on a particular pondok's syllabus and the fame of a tok guru, such that the 
duration of their education might extend to ten years or even longer. The teaching and 
learning process was practically a whole day affair, with intermittent recesses devoted to 
co-curricular training such as farming and calligraphy. The pedagogy employed by 
pondoks was the tadah kitab or buka btab (opening the book) method, by which a tok 
guru would sit at the centre of a semi-circle halaqah formed by his students when 
delivering lessons, all of them referring simultaneously to the same kitab. Memorisation 
of lessons was strictly emphasised. The overall system was umumi (unstructured I 
general), in that students were neither divided according to age group nor was their 
progress monitored through examinations; rather, it was the tok guru who graduated his 
students, by way of a simple testimonial, upon satisfaction that he had mastered a subject. 
As testament to their transnational reputation within the region, famous pondoksin 
Malaya and Patani in southern Thailand attracted students from as far as Sumatra and 
Cambodia. 53 
52 Abdullah Ishak, 'Pengajian Pondok dan Kesannya Terhadap Masyarakat di Malaysia' in Abd. Halim El-
Muharnmady (ed.), PendidiJean Islam: Peranannya DaZam Pembangunal1 Ummah, pp. 159-160; Abdullah 
Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, pp. 189-191; Roff, 'Pondoks, Madrasahs and the 
Production of 'U1ama' in Malaysia', pp. 6-7. 
53 For details on the pondok educational system and its global outreach, see Abdullah Alwi Haji Hassan, 
'The Development of Islamic Education in Kelantan' in Tamadun Islam di Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
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For pondok graduates who wished to pursue higher education in furtherance of 
their ambitions to become ulama, Mecca was their natural destination. Mecca at the end 
of the nineteenth century had a thriving Malay-Muslim diaspora known as the Jawi 
community, boasting prolific authors of household kitabs such as Daud Abdullah AI-
Fatani (d. 1847), Nawawi AI-Bantam (d. 1897), Wan Ahmad Muhammad Zain Mustafa 
Al-Fatani (d. 1908), Muhammad Arshad Al-Banjari (d. 1912) and Ahmad Khatib Abdul 
Latif Al-Minangkabawi (d. 1916), the first non-Arab to be appointed imam (prayer 
leader) at Masjid al-Haram (Grand Mosque) on behalf of the Shafi'e school ofjiqh. At 
Masjid al-Haram, teaching was conducted via the same halaqah system as in pondoks. 
So close was the relationship between Mecca and Southeast Asia that contemporary 
travelling accounts unofficially designated Acheh and Kelantan as Serambi Makkah 
(forecourt of Mecca). Many of these prominent Meccan-based ulama played the role of 
sufi sheikhs (spiritual mentors) as well. They would bequeath the ijazah (right) to teach 
their particular tariqahs (sufi orders) to favoured Jawi students, who would then spread 
such spiritual teachings in Southeast Asia in their simultaneous capacities as khalifah 
(vicegerent) of a tariqah and ulama who founded pondoks which functioned also as sufi 
zawwiyyahs or khanqahs (hospices or hermitages).54 Many historical accounts of the 
colonial period indicate that both the British and Dutch colonial governments were 
perturbed by the subversive implications of excessive contacts between the Malay-
Muslims and their Middle Eastern brethren through the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.55 
Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 1980), pp. 192-194; Taufik Abdullah, 'The Pesantren in Historical 
Perspective' in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), pp. 80-107; Abdullah Ishak, 'Pengajian Pondok 
dan Kesannya Terhadap Masyarakat di Malaysia', pp. 161-167; Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan 
Pengaruhnya eli Malaysia, pp. 197-218; Roff, 'Pondoks, Madrasahs and the Production of 'Ulama' in 
Malaysia', pp. 7-9; Hasan Madmarn, 'The Strategy of Islamic Education in South and Southeast Asia: 
Thailand Experience' in S. Yunanto, et. al, Islamic Education in South and Southeast Asia, pp. 225-237. 
54 Mohammad Redzuan Othman, 'The Role of Makka-educated Malays in the Development of Early 
Islamic Scholarship and Education in Malaya', Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (1998), pp. 146-
157; Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman, The Malays in the Middle East; With a 
Bibliography of Malay Printed Works Published in the Middle East (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya 
Press, 2000), chapters 1-2; Anthony H. Johns, 'Islamization in Southeast Asia: Reflections and 
Reconsiderations with Special Reference to the Role of Sufism', Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 31, no. 1 
(1993), pp. 53-59; Hasan Madmarn, 'The Strategy of Islamic Education in South and Southeast Asia: 
Thailand Experience', pp. 232-235. 
55 Cf. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 
40-43; Anthony Reid, 'Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia', Journal of Asian Studies 
26 (1967), pp. 270-271; Abdul Kadir Haji Din, 'Economic Implications of Moslem Pilgrimage from 
Malaysia', ContemporQlY Southeast Asia 4, no. 1 (1982), pp. 60-63; William R. Roff, 'The Meccan 
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In the 1920s, the flow of Malay students shifted in large numbers to Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo, influenced by two developments. First, the advent of the steamship 
as a mode of transportation plying the Suez Canal route. Second, uncertainties created by 
the Wahhabi ascendancy in Mecca following its capture by Abd aI-Aziz Ibn Saud in 1924 
and its subsequent absorption into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, proclaimed in 1932.56 
Although Saudi dominion was generally received with equanimity, the militant excesses 
displayed by Wahhabi warriors in endeavouring to cleanse the Islamic faith, for example 
by levelling the gravestones of deceased Prophet Muhammad's family members and 
companions, did alienate the more educated sections of the staunchly Sunni Malay-
Indonesian community in Hijaz.57 Thereafter, Al-Azhar played a leading role in Malay 
students' political socialisation and informal education, such that Malay rulers expressed 
anxiety over the students' exposure to radical nationalist ideas as a consequence of 
mingling with other nationalities. 58 As a contemporary student famously remarked, "In 
Mecca one could study religion only; in Cairo, politics as well. "59 Malay-Indonesian 
students never saw themselves as belonging to separate ethnic nationalities, and 
organised themselves into a single association. 60 Collaborating with Indonesian anti-
colonial activists such as Djanan Thaib, Muchtar Lum, Iljas Ja'kub and Mahmud Junus, 
Malayan students launched two politically aggressive journals, Seruan Azhar (Call of Al-
Pilgrimage: Its Meaning for Southeast Asian Islam' in Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. Johns (eds.), Islam 
in Asia: (vol. II: Southeast and East Asia) (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1984), p. 239; Fred R von der 
Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1993), pp. 4,10, 15. 
56 Wahhabism originated from the puritanical teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd aJ-Wahbab (d. 1787), who 
struck a strategic alliance with a tribal leader, Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), in 1744. It is notorious for its 
la mazhabi (anti-sectarian) doctrine enjoining repudiation of the four Sunni schools of fiqh, viz. Shafi'e, 
Malila, Hanafi and Hanbali; its excommunication of heretical Muslims; its zealous combat against 
purportedly idolatrous and innovative practices that had beset Muslims, many of whom were believed to 
have come under the undesirable influence of popular sufism. See Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The 
Politics of Islam (London: Faber and faber, 1982), pp. 159-169; K.H. Sirajuddin Abbas, l'itiqad 
Ahlussunnah Wal-jamaah (Kota Bharu: Pustaka Arnan Press, 1978), pp. 309-332. 
57 Literally meaning 'the barrier', Hijaz encompasses the vast lengthy region area on the western coast of 
the Arab peninsula stretching south from the Gulf of Aqaba, separated from the African continent by the 
Red Sea. Its major cities are Mecca, Medina, Jeddah and Taif. Its forcible merger with Nejd by Ibn Saud in 
1926 paved the way for the inauguration of the Saudi Arabian state. On the Malay reaction to the triumph 
of Wahhabism, see Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman, The Malays in the Middle 
East, pp. 6, 48. 
58 William R Roff, 'Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920's', Indonesia, vol. 9 (1970), pp. 
74-75, fn. 5. 
59 Quoted in Roff, 'Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920's', p. 74. 
60 Roff, 'Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920's', p. 73; Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and 
Mohammad Redzuan Othman, The Malays in the Middle East, pp. 48-49. 
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Azhar) (1925-28) and Pilehan Timor (Choice of the East) (1927-28). Free from 
censorship regulations, these periodicals freely indulged in topics which were taboo in 
Malaya, focusing on Pan-Islamism, Pan-Malayism and anti-colonial nationalism. 61 
Despite recurrent fmancial constraints, both Seruan Azhar and Pile han Timor enj oyed 
wide subscriptions and unrestricted circulation throughout Malaya and the Netherlands 
East Indies.62 
Upon returning to Malaya, this new generation of Middle Eastern graduates 
joined forces with the Kaum Muda (Young Faction) movement helmed by the Arab-
Malay community. Through inter-marriage, business enterprise, charitable deeds and the 
command of Arabic and religious knowledge, these Arabs had gained entree into and 
won admiration from Malay-Muslim societyY Together with the Jawi Peranakan -
locally born Indian Muslims, they started a flurry of publications which highlighted the 
material backwardness of the Malays in their homeland. Common religious affiliation 
enabled these Arabs and Jawi Perana"kan to write as Malays and identify themselves with 
Malay problems.64 Operating mainly from the Straits Settlements of Penang and 
Singapore, their works escaped the censorship imposed in the Malay states by the Islamic 
officialdom under British auspices. Through their journalistic efforts, the refornllst ethos 
penetrated Malay society. Four Kaum A1uda proponents were especially prominent, viz. 
Sayyid Sheikh Ahmad Al-Hadi (d. 1934), Sheikh Mohd. Tahir lalaluddin AI-Amari (d. 
1956), Haji Abbas Mohd. Taha (d. 1946) and Sheikh Mohd. Salim Al-Kalali.65 All had 
been influenced by, and were in close contact with, the Al-Manar (The Beacon) circle in 
Cairo,66 and through the periodical AI-Imam (1906-08), modelled on the Arabic 
61 Radin Soenarno, 'Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941', Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol. 1, no. 1 
(1960), pp. 8-10; William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 87-89. 
62 Md. Sidin Alunad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman, The Malays in the Middle East, pp. 64-66. 
63 Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 40-43. 
64 Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 47-49; Khoo Kay Kim, 'Sino-Malaya Relations in 
Peninsular Malaysia before 1942', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 12, no. 1 (1981), pp. 95-96. 
65 Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 59-65. 
66 The Egyptian AI-Manar circle was led by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), former Rector of AI-Azhar 
University and Grand Mufti of Egypt, and his disciple Rashid Rida (d. 1935), both of whom were deeply 
influenced by the pan-Islamic ideals of Jamal al-Din AI-Afghani (d. 1897). While Abduh is widely 
regarded as the father of Islamic modernism, Rashid Rida's synthesis of Abduh's thoughts heralded the 
salaft school of Islamic reform which stresses on emulating the practises of pious predecessors within the 
first three centuries of the Prophet Muhammad's demise. In Malaya, the AI-Manar strand was to have the 
greatest and longest-lasting impact amongst contemporary reformist impulses; see Fred R. von der Mehden, 
Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Gainesville: University 
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newspapers AI-Manar and AI-Urwat aI-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Link), they 
disseminated their ideas. 67 Instead of calling for a political overthrow of the colonial 
government, the Kaum Muda's prescribed panacea was education, not traditional pondok 
education but a modern madrasah system which combined both instructions in the 
fundamentals of Islam and Western-influenced educational methods and technology.68 
Kaum Muda was a largely urban phenomenon; it suffered from lack of appeal among the 
rural Malay masses. Under pressure from circumscription imposed by the Kaum Tua (Old 
Faction)-controlled religious bureaucracy, Kaum Muda movement was left politically 
moribund by the 1940s.69 
While its political reverberations were short-lived, the Kaum Muda's 
educational impact was perennial. Kaum Muda's expose of the woes engulfing the 
Malay-Muslims awakened societal elites as to the urgency of reform so as not be 
surpassed economically and politically ill their own homeland. Pondoks, whose 
leaderships were gradually taken over by the returning Middle Eastern graduates, 
responded to the new reformist wave by converting their umumi institutions into 
madrasahs adopting the nizami (structured) system, whereby students were demarcated 
according to proper classrooms based on age-groups, taught curricula which incorporated 
modern sciences alongside the traditional revealed sciences, and SUbjected to written 
examinations. 70 Beginning with the pioneering move of Madrasah Al-Ma'arif, founded in 
Singapore in 1936 by the sufi-oriented yet reformist-inclined Sheikh Muhammad 
Fadhlullah Suhaimi (d. 1964), to open enrolment to female students, 7] madrasahs 
gradually assumed co-educational status. Many of these madrasahs fiercely guarded their 
independence and were the alma mater of many anti-colonial fighters belonging to the 
Press of Florida, 1993), pp. 13-14; Azyumardi Azra, 'The Transmission of al-Manar's Reformism to the 
Malay Indonesian World: The Cases of aI-Imam and al-Munir', Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal jor 
Islamic Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (1999), pp. 79-81. 
67 Azra, 'The Transmission of al-Manar's Reformism to the Malay Indonesian World', pp. 82-92; Anthony 
C. Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the 
Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 137-145. 
68 Roff, The Origins ojMalayNationalism, pp. 75-77. 
69 Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 79-81. 
70 Abdullah Ishak, Pendidikan Islam dan Pengaruhnya di Malaysia, p. 196; Roff, 'Pondoks, Madrasahs 
and the Production of 'Ulama' in Malaysia', pp. 10-13. 
71 Ni'mah bt HJ Ismail Vmar, Fadhlullah Suhaimi (U1u Kelang: Progressive Publishing House, 1998), p. 
62; Syed Muhd Khairudin AlJunied and Dayang Istiaisyah Hussin, 'Estranged from the Ideal Past: 
Historical Evolution of Madrassahs in Singapore', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 25, no. 2 
(2005), p. 253. 
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leftist stream, which saw a peculiar intertwining between Islamic and Malay-Indonesian 
nationalist ideals. Pan-Islamist sentiments combined forces with Indonesian-imported 
anti-colonialism to produce the fIrst stirrings of Malay nationalism, conceptualised 
around the ideals of a Greater Malaya (Melayu-Raya) and Greater Indonesia (Indonesia-
Raya).72 
5. Globalisation of Islamic Education in Post-Colonial Southeast Asia: 
Thailand, Indonesian and Malaysian Cases Compared 
Post-Second World War decolonisation and independence brought about new 
dilemmas for Southeast Asian Muslims, especially with reference to the implementation 
of Islam in their daily lives, of which education was a cardinal part. Generally, Muslims 
found themselves at the crossroads between loyalty to the nation state and allegiance to 
ideals of Islam, which had fIgured amongst signifIcant forces propelling the fight towards 
political independence. On one side of the coin, some Muslims became minorities who 
were denied recognition of their political and legal rights, thus fuelling irredentist 
demands and separatist movements which have gained sympathy from the ummah but 
conversely have been at the receiving end of assimilationist policies and repression 
perpetrated by their own governments. The most prominent cases have been the struggles 
of the Malay-Muslims of Thailand's southernmost provinces of Patani, Yala and 
Narathiwat, and the Moro-Muslims of southern Philippines. In addition, Singaporean 
Muslims were instantly transformed from a numerical maj ority to minority when 
Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia on 9 August 1965. In all three countries, 
Muslims have been involved in a perennial tussle with their sovereign governments in 
their efforts to preserve the independence and integrity of a genuine Islamic education. 
The task has been made especially difficult with the stigma attached to independent 
Islamic schools and colleges as dens of potential insurrectionists who have allegedly been 
indoctrinated, through divisive curricula and educational methods, to fIght their infidel 
72 Radin Soenarno, 'Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941', pp. 8-10; Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, 
pp.87-89. 
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governments. In showing how Islamic education has been globalised within a Muslim-
minority political milieu, Thailand has been chosen as an example. 
In southern Thailand, education has been a long-standing bone of contention 
between the central government in Bangkok and Malay-Muslims who have persistently 
resisted attempts to dilute their Islamicity, which they deem as ineAiricablytied to their 
Malay identity. Since the 1930s, successive Thai governments have endeavoured to 
coerce the Malay-Muslims into dropping Malay and Arabic in favour of the Thai 
language as their medium of education, and to absorb pondoks into the national education 
system by transforming them into private Islamic schools eligible for state frnancial and 
manpower support but at the expense of stricter regulation. In 1970-71, legal registration 
of pondoks was enforced and no new ones was allowed to open. In 1982, officially 
registered pondoks acquired the status of private Islamic schools by law, with a 
discernible change in curriculum content meant to inculcate 'Thainess' as part of the 
Muslims' national identity.73 Within Thailand's assimilationist model of national 
integration, dual ethno-national identities were not recognised. Education became a major 
tool of the Thai state to effect the transformation of Patani Malay-Muslims into 'Thai 
Muslims', with a corresponding shift in their focus of loyalty from the historic Malay 
sultanate of Pat ani to the present Thai state and monarchy.74 
Nonetheless, Thailand's coercive educational policies merely globalised the 
practitioners of Islamic education by driving them to pursue higher studies abroad. 
Ironically, policies designed to stem domestic insurgency had the long term unintended 
effect of introducing Thai Muslim youth to variegated and perhaps even radical strands of 
Islamic activism imported from South Asia and the Middle East, their two most favoured 
destinations for Islamic qualifications.75 Alumni linkages lead to informal memoranda of 
understanding and the founding of sister institutions or branch campuses in Thailand. 
Hence the Islamic educational terrain of Thailand today has been convoluted by not only 
the official private Islamic schools, but also by the stubborn presence of unregistered 
73 Hasan Madmarn, 'The Strategy ofIslamic Education in South and Southeast Asia: Thailand Experience' , 
pp. 237-238; Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand, pp. 2-3. 
74 Patrick lory, 'From Melayu Patani to Thai Muslim: The spectre of ethnic identity in southern Thailand', 
South East Asia Research, vol. 15, no. 2 (2007), pp. 260-263, 275. 
75 Joseph Liow, 'The Pond ok Schools of Southern Thailand: Bastion of Islamic Education or Hotbed of 
Militancy', IDSS Commentaries 32/2004 (Singapore: Instirute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2004),p. 
2; Recruiting Militants in Southel71 Thailand, p. 2. 
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pondoks and the establishments of schools affiliated with foreign-based Islamist 
movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Jamaat Tabligh 
from South Asia, the sufi-inclined Darnl Arqam from Malaysia and most recently, the 
Muhammadiyah from Indonesia.76 At the official level, Wahhabi-Salafi reformism has 
penetrated Thailand's Islamic educational sphere through the efforts of Dr. Ismail Lutfi 
Japakiya, the AI-Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud University alumnus who has successfully 
harnessed his wide Middle Eastern contacts towards supporting the founding of the state-
approved Yala Islamic University. Amidst rumours that Dr. Ismail was involved in 
spreading IT wings in Thailand, plus financial difficulties arising from the post-9/11 
moratorium placed on Saudi Arabia-derived funds, he has dexterously aligned himself 
with state-sanctioned Islamic causes, which included stints in the National Reconciliation 
Commission, the Senate and as advisor to the Chularatmontri or Sheikh al-Islam.n 
Fixation among policy-making circles that there must have been foreign hands 
involved in the new cycle of violence since January 2004, showcasing unprecedented 
levels of sophistication and coordination,78 probably influenced the state's hardline 
policies which had pondoks and their teachers as favourite targets for unwarranted 
searches, interrogation and even abduction. 79 This only aggravated the situation by 
.' 
instigating Muslim retaliatory incursions which witnessed daring arson attacks against 
state schools, the most potent symbol of persecution of Muslims in Thailand.80 In actual 
fact, there is sparse evidence to implicate the global outreach of Islamic educational 
schemes in southern Thailand with the drastic escalation of religious violence there. 81 
The violence has incurred the displeasure of international Muslim NGOs and dented 
76 Alexander Horstmann, 'The Revitalization of Islam in Southeast Asia: The Cases of Darul Arqam and 
Jemaat Tabligh', Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journalfor Islamic Studies, vol. 13, no. 1 (2006), pp. 73-74; 
Muhammadiyah Offers Thai South Help', 
http://www.islamonline.netiservletiSatellite?c=Articl e C&cid=1188043914166&pagename=Zone-English-
NewslNWELayout, posted 27 August 2007 (accessed 14 November 2009); Joseph Liow, 'Local Networks 
and Transnational Islam in Thailand (with emphasis on the southernmost provinces)' in Peter Mandaville 
et al., Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia, p. 197. 
77 Liow, 'Local Networks and Transnational Islam in Thailand (with emphasis on the southernmost 
provinces)', pp. 200-204. 
78 Joseph Liow, 'The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of Domestic and 
International Dimensions', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27 (2004), p. 536. 
79 Liow, 'The Pondok Schools of Southern Thailand: Bastion ofIslarnic Education or Hotbed of Militancy', 
p.2. 
80 Liow, 'The Security Situation in Southern Thailand', p. 531. 
81 Joseph Liow, 'International Jihad and Muslim Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative 
Interpretation', Asia Policy, no. 2 (2006), pp. 95-97. 
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Thailand's image within the ummah. 82 The more accommodative policies of governments 
following the ouster of Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006, have sought to locate 
Islamic education as a solution rather than the crux ofthe southern Thailand problem. For 
example, in 2007, exchange visits between delegations of the education ministries of 
Thailand and Malaysia took place in an effort to come up with proposals to refonn 
Islamic education in southern Thailand;83 a rare acknowledgement of how pivotal is the 
role of Islamic developments in Malaysia in determining the path undertaken by its 
Malay-Muslim brethren of Thailand. 84 Paradoxically, even if such refonns were 
undertaken, it is not necessarily a harbinger of peace, for recruitment of insurgents in 
southern Thailand schools works through infonnal educational channels rather than 
resulting from skewed interpretations of materials in formal curricula. 85 
On other side of the coin, the Muslim-majority countries of Indonesia and 
Malaysia undertook distinct paths towards globalisation of Islamic education. The 1945 
Indonesian Constitution is essentially a secular document which paves the way for the 
republic to be governed without recourse to principles of any religion. Embedded into the 
preamble of the Constitution is the Five Principles (Pancasila) which form the 
philosophical foundation of the Indonesian nation-state, viz. belief in the one and only 
God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by inner 
wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives, and social 
justice for the whole people of Indonesia. 86 In the face of opposition from non-Muslim 
leaders and secular-nationalists, Islamists had to drop the original 'seven words' of the 
Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter), which would have added the obligation "to implement 
the shari 'ah" as among Muslims' constitutional responsibilities. In 1959, calls for 
Piagam Jakarta were [mally suppressed by Sukarno's presidential decree. Following the 
downfall of President Soeharto, who had systematically depoliticised Islam and enforced 
82 Cf. 'Groups team up to send open letter calling for peace in southern Thailand', The Star, 29 June 2009. 
83 50 Tahun Pendidikan Islam di Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Bahagian Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian 
Pelajaran Malaysia, 2009), pp. 81-82, 134. _. 
84 Cf. Jory, 'From Melayu Patani to Thai Muslim', pp. 263-268. 
85 Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand, pp. 6-10. 
86 M.B. Hooker, 'Perspectives on Shari 'a and the State' in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds.), Islamic 
Perspectives on the New Millennium (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 203. 
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Pancasila as the sole ideological basis of lawful organizations, however, a handful of 
Is1amist parties have resurrected demands for Piagam Jakarta. 87 
Ironically, the long-time divorce between Islam and the state throughout both 
Sukarno and Soeharto's protracted administrations (1945-65, 1967-98) allowed Islamic 
education in Indonesia to flourish at the hands of independent civic organisations such as 
the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU: Renaissance 
of Ulama), founded in 1912 and 1926 respectively. Throughout this lengthy duration, the 
progress of Islamic education was overseen by the Departemen Agama (Department of 
Religion) rather than the Ministry of Education. But outright intervention in affairs of 
pesantrens and madrasahs was precluded by government self-restraint, ever mindful of 
the longer history and greater hold on society possessed by the civic organisations. Early 
attempts in 1950-51 to lower religious content in their curricula failed, as pesantren 
masters were reluctant to accept reforms imposed from a government seen to have come 
under communist influence. 88 An ardent admirer of Turkish-imported Kemalist 
secularism and an exemplar of the inclination among post-colonial Muslim leaders 
towards ideological hybridism, President Sukarno proudly professed a simultaneous 
devotion to non-institutionalised religion and Marxism, seeing no contradiction between 
the former's theism and the latter's atheism.89 · 
In 1972, Soeharto issued a presidential decree to unite non-religious and religious 
educational streams under the Ministry of Education, but with futile results. Only with 
the spawning of the Departemen Agama-backed Institut Agama Islam Negeri (lAIN: 
State Institute of Islamic Studies), which offered an avenue to thousands of pesantren 
graduates to pursue tertiary education and gain qualifications comparable to those 
obtained by their state school counterparts, did the pesantrens warm to the government's 
integrative efforts. The creation of IAINs was bolstered by several crucial appointments 
of pesantren graduates who had successfully ascended the modern educational ladder, in 
particular that of Professors A. Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali to the position of 
87 Azyumardi Azra 'Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia' in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds.), 
Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium, pp. 137-140,145-146. 
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Minister of Religious Affairs in 1971 and 1983 respectively.9o %at emerged from the 
appointment of scholars to ministerial portfolios responsible for Islam was a research-
based emphasis in Islamic education, as amply demonstrated by the less than dogmatic 
approach adopted by many IAINs which later were elevated to the status Universitas 
Islam Negeri (DIN: State Islamic Universities). DINs have proven to be bastions against 
Islamist radicalism, which elicits more support from Muslim students who underwent 
modern education at so-called 'secular' universities. 91 
In the 1980s, the Indonesian government began sponsoring state pesantrens and 
madrasahs whose curriculum content emphasised modem rather than traditional religious 
subjects. This move could have been a precursor to the next failed attempt to absorb all 
religious schools under the Ministry of Education, via a Revised Draft Law on National 
Education tabled in 1988. Overwhelmed by protests from independent Islamic groups, 
the fInal outcome, Law No. 211989, maintained non-state operators' rights to provide 
Islamic education.92 As a result of the dominance of the 'civic religion' fOrm of Islamic 
discourse in the Soeharto era, Islam became a very important driver for socio-educational 
change without being overtly political. As confIrmed by results of opinion surveys and 
general elections, enthusiasm for Islam has not translated into an outburst of support for 
Islamist political parties, whose scripturalist projection of Islam as necessarily involving 
imposition of shari 'ah (Islamic law) is not necessarily attuned with a general 
understanding of Islam as primarily a socio-cultural and educational phenomenon. 93 
Globalisation of Islamic education took the form of engendering innovative thought and 
practice which have made their mark, albeit amidst controversies, in the ummah. Within 
Southeast Asia, the position of Indonesia as a beehive of novel Islamic thought is 
undisputed. The hope Bassam Tibi gives to "Southeast Asian Muslims" to ease "the 
desperate situation of Islamic civilization," is pertinent especially to Indonesian 
intellectuals.94 With reference to the quality of neo-modernist Islamic thought and 
scholarship as developed by Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid in Indonesia, 
90 Farish A Noor, Thinking the Unthinkable, pp. 17,20. 
91 Farish A Noor, Thinking the Unthinkable, pp. 23-24, 27-30. 
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Greg Barton is firm that "Indonesia can no longer objectively be said to be of peripheral 
importance to the Islamic world. ,,95 Indeed, Nurcholish's ideas influenced not only 
Soeharto, who eventually made overtures to Islamic civic activism in 1990 through his 
patronage of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
IndoneSia), but also made a profound impact on Malaysia's Islamist icon Anwar Ibrahim, 
as embodied in his own concoction of Islam Madani (Civil Islam) which he propagated 
during his tenure as Deputy Prime Minister (1994-98).96 
In the post-Soeharto era, despite rising concern over the global terrorist threat, the 
fourteen thousand or so pesantrens have largely maintained their independence. The 
National Education Act No. 20/2003 recognises three outlets through which Islamic 
education may be legally transmitted, viz. the formal, non-formal and informal channels; 
the latter two thereby subsuming pesantren and madrasah education into the national 
education system. Only about twenty percent of privately educated Muslim santris 
(religious stream students) study using a fully government-instituted curriculum.97 
However, research on different varieties of independent pesantrens conducted by J akarta-
based RlDEP (Research Institute for Education and Peace) field researchers in 2005, 
covering West Java, Central Java, East Java and Makassar, reveals that a large number of 
established independent pesantrens had willingly accepted curricula offered by the 
Departemen Agama and the Ministry of National Education. Although such 
accommodation may have been piecemeal and ambivalent, the urge among pesantren 
masters to adopt modernising reforms in management, pedagogy and acquisition of 
worldly knowledge among santris is encouraging.98 Pesantrens are not hotbeds of 
militancy, dogmatism and educational backwardness as often assumed by their detractors. 
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Staggeringly, such an observation even applies to the so-called 'movement pesantrens' 
whose roots can be traced back to S.M. Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam rebellion against 
Sukarno's secular state. As far as the surmise that many of them supply foot soldiers for 
the array ofpost-Soeharto radical Islamist groups that has emerged,99 this is possible only 
when taking into account the pesantrens' informal curricula and alumni network, which 
are not necessarily intertwined with their official authorities. IOO 
Lastly, we turn to Malaysia, which enjoys the reputation of being one of the most 
advanced Islamic nation states in not only Asia but also the world. Here, the position of 
Islamic education is arguably safeguarded by Article 3(1): "Islam is the religion of the 
Federation, but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the 
Federation."lol Although education is placed under federal jurisdiction in its Ninth 
Schedule, the technical administration of Islam falls under the jurisdiction of the various 
states which make up the Federation of Malaysia. l02 As such, states have traditionally 
wielded considerable authority and autonomy over Islamic education, as manifested most 
clearly in the running of religious schools. However, over the years, this clout has been 
significantly reduced as the central government tightens its grip over Islamic affairs. The 
Education Act of 1961 set off a process absorbing Islamic education under the national 
educational system. Islamic religious lessons were made a core part of the syllabi in both 
government primary and secondary schools. 103 State governments and the Ministry of 
Education were assigned responsibilities for recruitment of the teachers in primary 
schools and secondary school respectively.l04 Thereafter, both state and private Islamic 
schools registered parallel declines in enrolment. I 05 The time allocation for revealed 
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religious sciences was reduced to make way for more slots for rational sciences often-
tenned 'secular'. Malay language replaced Arabic as the medium of instruction in all 
subjects except Arabic itself. Despite the widening of the madrasahs' syllabi, their 
constrained budget meant they were on the losing side vis-a.-vis government schools as 
far as attracting highly qualified teachers and providing instructional facilities were 
concerned. 106 
In 1974, the transfer of authority over primary Islamic education from state 
governments to the federal government was virtually completed. 107 The :Ministry of 
Education subsequently established a Textbook Bureau which controlled the content and 
discourse of Islamic education by ensuring that schools use only specially approved 
textbooks written by Ministry-commissioned authors. los The founding of an Islamic 
Teachers Training College (MPI: Maktab Perguruan Islam) in 1977 launched the 
momentum for the full absorption of religious teachers into the federal administrative 
scheme, culminating with the passing of a 1991 Education Act legitimising the transfer of 
religious educators hitherto regulated by various states' religious councils (Majlis Agama 
Islam).109 Following the Cabinet Committee Report on Educational Policy of 1979, which 
criticised the lack of practical aspects in the delivery of Islamic lessons and the 
methodical weaknesses of Islamic educators,110 an Integrated Secondary School 
Curriculum (KBSM: Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah) was launched. Seeking to 
combine theoretical knowledge with practical skills and moral values, KBSM was 
purportedly guided by resolutions of the First World Conference on Muslim Education 
held in Mecca in 1977. 111 Since the 1980s, additional core subjects have been introduced 
to bolster secondary-level Islamic education as a whole. Four of them, viz. Higher Arabic 
Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia (Singapore and Bangi: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and 
Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, 2008), p. 209. 
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language, Tasawwur Islam, Al-Quran and Al-Sunnah education and Islamic Shari 'ah 
education (all introduced in 1992), also serve as electives for students of the two non-
religious streams.l12 
The death mell of independent Islamic education in Malaysia was sounded by the 
Malaysian government's decision in late 2002 to withdraw automatic per capita grants to 
private Sekolahs Agama Rakyat (SARs: Community Religious Schools), successors of 
the pondok tradition. Not a few from among opposition party leaders and scholars related 
the move to post- 9/11 pressure exerted by the USA, Malaysia'S largest trading partner.1!3 
Statistics indicate that at the time Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir launched his campaign 
against SARs, student enrolment in SARs was at an all-time high of 126,000 in 2003.114 
Relenting to grassroots Muslims' protests, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister 
2003-09, partially reversed the denial of grants to SARs, and instead sought to woo 
Muslims back into the mainstream educational system by strengthening the Islamic 
curriculum in national schools. I IS The most comprehensive effort to date in this direction 
has been the introduction of the J-QAF programme in primary schools. An acronym for 
'Jawi, Quran, Arabic and Fard 'Ain', J-QAF employs five teaching models towards 
achieving the target of fundamental mastery of the four aforesaid subjects by the end of a 
Muslim pupil's primary education.1J6 Under intense financial pressure, many SARs have 
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effectively foregone their independence in exchange for the status of fully aided 
government religious schools (SABK: Sekolah Agama Bantuan Keraj aan). 117 
The changeover of the stewardship of government from the Islamic-educated 
Abdullah Badawi to the Western-educated Najib Razak in April 2009 has given no signal 
that the centripetal drive of officially defined Islamic education would recede. In fact, in a 
recent meeting between Deputy Prime Minister-cum-Education Minister Muhyiddin 
Yassin, Higher Education Minister Mohamed Khaled Nordin, Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department Jamil Khir Baharom and officials from the Department of 
Advancement of Islam of Malaysia (J.A.KTh1: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia), it was 
decided that "a special committee with representatives from several agencies would be 
set up to streamline Islamic Studies and review several areas, including its curriculum, 
teachers and their qualijications."1J8 The ideal form and practice of an Islamic 
curriculum, as conceived for instance by Syed Naguib Al-Attas,J19 remains far-fetched in 
state-sanctioned Islamic education in Malaysia. Whatever form of globalisation that is 
supposed to take place with respect to Islamic education in Malaysia, will continually be 
mediated by the state. The outcome in terms of enforcement of a homogenised form of 
Islamic orthodoxy, deviancy from which is criminalised by states' religious laws, is all 
too obvious in Malaysia. 
Islamic education in Malaysia has lost much of its globalising potential by making 
its point of reference the Malaysian nation-state rather than the ummah. Policies 
pertaining to Islamic education were undertaken based upon political interests. Without 
breaking the stranglehold that PAS has over SARs in Kelantan, which it ruled in 1959-78 
and has been controlling since 1990, developed through many decades of networking 
between the PAS ulama and the rural masses, it is virtually impossible for the ruling 
National Front (EN: Barisan Nasional) government to wrest the state from PAS. State-
imposed Islamic education has been tailored towards producing compliant ulama and 
religious officials who would then staff the burgeoning Islamic bureaucracy and 
institutions. The creation of colleges and university faculties offering tertiary Islamic 
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education served as these students' channels to obtain the necessary qualifications so as 
to be "eligible for appointments in the public service.'mo Landmarks in spurring the 
production of new cohorts of shari 'ah-based lawyers, consultants, economists, judges 
and religious functionaries to fill posts in the expanding structure of Islamic 
administration and widening network of state-sanctioned Islamic fmancial institutions,l2J 
were the establishments of the Islamic Academy, University of Malaya in 1981 and the 
International Islamic University of Malaysia CIIUM) in 1983.122 The IIUM, in being 
jointly sponsored by Muslim countries and using English and Arabic as official languages 
of instruction, was of course an accomplishment of sorts by the government in the area of 
globalisation. 
In 1999, the Malaysian government founded its second full-fledged Islamic 
tertiary educational institution, the Islamic University College of Malaysia (KUIM: Kolej 
Universiti Islam Malaysia), which has since been upgraded to the Islamic Science 
University of Malaysia (USIM: Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia). Global recognition for 
a novel form of Islamic education "not just confined to subjects that are typically 
associated with Islamic studies" has been identified as one ofUSIM's achievements in its 
first decade. USIM prides itself in the fact that forty percent of its postgraduate students 
are foreign nationals, a significant number of whom are fITst language Arabic-speakers 
from countries of the Middle Eastern Islamic heartlands. 123 In fact, since 9/11, many 
more of such cohorts of students have chosen Malaysia as their destination for higher 
studies not only in religious sciences but also in scientific, technological and other 
professional disciplines. 124 In its promotion of Malaysia as an international education 
hub,125 the Malaysian government has contributed towards reversing historical anomalies, 
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developed through centuries of inequitable interaction and exacerbated by the dearth of 
research institutes in the Middle East devoted to the study of Asia and Asians, of a centre 
- periphery relationship that views Islam in Southeast Asia condescendingly as laden 
with popular indigenous accretions, in contrast with the scriptural and 'authentic' Islam 
of the Arabs.126 
6. Concluding Remarks 
International interest in Islamic education has surged since the onset of the USA-
marshalled GWOT, but perhaps for all the wrong reasons. Undue attention has been 
given to institutions which claim or are portrayed to provide some form of Islamic 
education, without proper examination whether these institutions' guiding ethos and 
practices conform or not to the genuine foundations of Islamic education as found in its 
long and distinguished history. In many cases, Islamic education has been confused with 
Islamist education; 'Islamist' here being adjectival to 'Islamism' instead of 'Islam'. 
While Islam refers to a religious faith or comprehensive way of life in which a Muslim in 
both the individual and social sense submits to God spiritually, intellectually 2illd 
physically, 'Islamism' is ideologically biased towards political action designed to 
establish Islam as the supreme creed of a polity and social order. 127 The former has as its 
aim mardatillah (God's Pleasure), which would secure salvation for a soul in the 
Hereafter and encourage moral goodness towards fellow humans on earth, whereas the 
latter's path is overwhelmingly defmed by its professed ,goal of an 'Islamic state' on 
earth. Often times, for the Islamist, the Machiavellian principle of 'the ends justify the 
means' takes precedence over ummatic tumult, which is regarded as a necessary evil and 
temporary sacrifice towards securing his worldly target of a shari 'ah-based rulership on 
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earth. His object of adulation becomes the dawlah (state) - essentially a nomocracy 
whose frame of reference is not the people but the shari 'ah, perceived as immutable, 
rather than God. 128 In this, the Islamist has unwittingly or not secularised the Islamic 
faith, whose concern for the welfare of the ummah is paramount. The difference between 
the two categories often eludes the Islamist: while the ummah is "centred on unity in 
moral values and faith," the so-called 'Islamic state' negotiates its political and legal 
dimensions through contestations in matters of territoriality, citizenry and governance. 129 
In the history of human civilisation, various fOIms of injustice and violence have been 
erroneously legitimised in the defence of selfish interests related to such political 
categories. 
Islamists have done a great disservice to Islam by over-emphasising its political 
and governmental aspects and concomitantly denigrating the more cardinal aspects of 
individual and moral regeneration which constitutes the true essence of Islamic 
education. 130 In its authentic form, Islamic education is necessarily God-centric and 
ummah-centric, and will not condone unjust actions and methods undertaken in the name 
of religion. Yet, in spite of the enthusiasm shown for the establishment of Islamic 
schools, colleges and universities throughout the ummah, such endeavours are seldom 
undertaken with a view to addressing the epistemological and philosophical deficiencies 
of the modem educational system. Instead, they represent rather desperate attempts to 
preserve one's Islamic or Muslim identity, even if in rudiments only.13J A revamp ofthe 
educational systems prevailing in Muslim countries, while having been constantly on the 
agenda of Muslim scholars, leaders, politicians and activists alike, is indeed a tall order, 
calling for ummatic participation not bound by national intricacies and complexities. The 
complexity of this task is borne out by the myriad ways and patterns in which 
globalisation of Islamic education has been attempted and experienced by Muslim 
individuals, organisations and governments in Southeast Asia. 
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